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SUMMARY
This paper reviews the main findings of empirical research on 
British transnational corporations with industrial operations in 
the fifteen countries of English speaking Africa. The research 
reveals that not only is the level of equity involvements of 
British industrial TNCs in these countries of very minor 
importance in global terms but that, as a consequence of the deep 
and protracted economic crisis of the 1980s in Africa, nearly one 
third of these TNCs have withdrawn from the continent since 1979. 
The possible consequences of this process of corporate 
disengagement are explored, especially in the light of the now 
universal policy objective of African governments to attract 
foreign capital and, in particular, transnational corporations.
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1.INTRODUCTION
The potential role and actual impact of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) on industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa has over the 
years been a highly controversial subject among both policymakers and 
researchers in these countries. More recently, this controversy 
has been fuelled by the comprehensive liberalisation of foreign 
investment policies and practices which has become an integral 
component of pervasive structural adjustment programmes.
By 1988, more than twenty SSA countries were revising their 
foreign investment codes or introducing new ones (IFC, 1988). 
Thus, from positions of overt hostility towards FDI by most SSA 
governments during the 1960s and 1970s (which often culminated in 
full or partial nationalisation), the almost universal policy 
objective of the late 1980s is to encourage foreign investment, 
especially by transnational corporations.
Both the architects and followers of structural adjustment
programmes see FDI as playing a potentially very significant
I am grateful to the managers of the British companies who kindly
agreed to participate in this study and, in particular, those who
completed the questionnaire. My colleague Bogdan Stefanski, and
Nicola Swainson and Martin Godfrey made valuable comments on an 
earlier draft of this article.
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role in helping to resolve the profoundly serious economic 
crises that still continue to afflict most SSA countries. The 
arguments advanced in support of FDI are not however 
particularly new. Indeed, they have been expounded by proponents 
of FDI for many years, (see Colmanl976). Essentially, FDI 
and, in particular, foreign corporate investments is seen as 
providing much needed technologies and associated management and 
technical skills which are unavailable or in short supply in developing 
countries. With the increasing transnationalisation of the world 
economy (see UNCTC, 1989), SSA countries must gain access to these 
technologies or run the grave risk of remaining economically 
marginalised for decades to come. Another increasingly forceful 
argument is that for countries with mounting debt burdens, the use 
of foreign equity capital (rather than reliance on loan capital) is 
the only sensible alternative to financing this investment process. 
According to Tieuwl, therefore, " the question is not whether 
African countries need foreign investment but whether they can 
attract it in sufficient quantities and on acceptable terms to make 
a sufficient impact on development." (Tieuwl, 1986:43)
The strident criticisms of FDI and TNCs so prevalent in policy­
making and academic circles in the majority of SSA countries up 
until the early 1980s are therefore being rapidly submerged in a 
tidalwave of official support, for foreign investment. In short, 
policyssakers seem to be discarding the theories of imperialism 
and dependence that have hitherto been so ideologically and 
theoretically dominant and replacing them with an essentially 
neoclassical paradigm that regards trade and investment between
rich and poor countries as mutually beneficial rather than 
exploitative.
At a time when these important shifts in investment policies are 
occurring, it is surprising to find that so little substantive 
research is being undertaken on FDI in Africa, both in absolute 
terms (1) and in relation to what was being done during the 
1970s.(2) Of particular concern, is the paucity of good 
quality data available that collectively could provide a clear, 
detailed overview and understanding of the extent and forms of FDI 
in Africa during the last ten years or so.
This article presents the preliminary results of research that 
seeks to furnish some of these missing data for a major segment 
of FDI in Africa, namely British corporate investment in 
industrial enterprises in the countries of English speaking 
Africa (ESA). These countries are Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.(3) Collectively, they 
accounted for 54.6% of the total population and 66% of total 
value added in industrial production in sub-Saharan Africa in 
the mid 1980s and over 90% of U.K. industrial investment 
in Africa as a whole (excluding South Africa and Namibia).(4)
British corporate investment comprises between 50-80% of all 
industrial FDI in each ESA country.(5) Consequently, current 
trends iri the level of British corporate involvement are not only 
highly significant in their own right but, may also indicate 
similar trends among TNC.-j from other metropolitan countries (in
particular, France and the United States of America) in both ESA 
and the remainder of sub-Saharan Africa.
The main objective of this initial phase of the research has been 
to answer the following basic questions concerning British 
industrial FDI in ESA:
* How many U.K. parent companies have on-going equity 
involvements and in which countries?
* What are the characteristics of these parent companies in 
terms of key size indicators (global turnover, employment, 
net assets and the total number of countries in which they 
have equity involvements)?
* What are the total number of equity involvements by country 
and type of industrial activity ? What is the distribution 
of involvements among the parent companies?
* What is the pattern of equity involvements by country? In
particular, what is the extent of minority shareholdings in 
ESA countries?
* What has happened to the total number of U.K. industrial 
parent companies operating in ESA during the years of 
economic crisis in ESA during the 1980s? More specifically, 
to what extent have British companies disengaged from the 
continent?
* What have been the principal factors influencing the levels 
of involvement during the 1980s and what are the main 
constraints likely to impede increased industrial investment 
in the future as is hoped for by the supporters of 
structural adjustment programmes?
2. DATA SOURCES
In order to answer these questions, two sets of primary data 
have been collected and utilised. First, all British companies 
with industrial i.e. manufacturing equity involvements ir; f'SA in 19?S 
and 1989 were identified using United Kingdom and E3A national company 
directories, lists of "British connected" companies provided by
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British trade attaches in ESA countries and other relevant 
publications (6). All parent companies were then written to and asked 
to confirm whether the company had an ownership stake in one or more 
industrial enterprises in any of the ESA countries and, if so, to 
provide information on the percentage of equity held and the type of 
products manufactured.(7) Obtaining this information was essential 
because of the many errors and ommissions contained in the company 
directories coupled with the difficulty of ascertaining whether the 
companies listed were actually engaged in manufacturing rather than 
just trade and/or service activities in ESA. Over 80% of the 
200 companies contacted provided this basic information.
Where correspondents stated that their company had no ESA 
industrial involvements, follow-up letters were sent to ascertain 
whether any relevant investments had been disposed of and, if so, 
when, to whom and for what reasons.
Only British parent companies registered under the U.K. Companies 
Act are included in this analysis. Thus, those U.K. companies 
with ESA investments but which are ultimately owned by foreign 
parents have been excluded.(8) There are also a number of 
industrial companies in ESA countries that are owned or have 
siseable investments by individual British nationals. Investment 
of this kind comprises a significant component of FDI in certain 
ESA countries (most notably Nigeria, Zambia and, at least up until 
the late 1970s, Ghana),(9) Little is known about these 
individuals but from the names of their managing directors, 
many of them appear to be of Asian and Middle Eastern descent.(10) 
However, since they are not U.K. registered corporate entities.
they have been excluded from the survey.
The second set of data were obtained from companies with confirmed 
industrial equity involvements in ESA countries. A short (two 
page) questionnaire requested information in the following three 
areas: (1) For each equity involvement, the name and address of 
the company, year of initial investment, total employment, expatriate 
employment, turnover, net earnings, capital employed; (2) Trends 
during the 1980s concerning equity holdings and other forms of 
involvement, most notably licence and franchise and management and 
technical servive agreements; (3) An ordinal ranking of the five 
most serious problems that their ESA companies have had to contend 
with during the 1980s.
Twenty companies out of the total of 96 with industrial investments 
in ESA fully completed the questionnaire. The low response rate is 
not surprising given the perceived sensitivity of much of the 
information that was requested.(11) Nevertheless, the data 
albeit only partial at this stage of the research gives important 
insights into the nature of British corporate involvement in ESA.
These two sets of data have been supplemented with survey data 
published by the Department of Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom 
on the net earnings. net investments and book values of British 
FDI during the period J373-1987 ( 12> Finally, more qualitative 
infor-taticr has been utilised from a number of publications most 
notably the quarterly reports of the Economist lets’iigenoe Unit 
for each ESA country and the 's i r.ess pro#5 at both the 
international and national love's
3. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
The importance of Africa as a location of British overseas 
investment has, in global terms, declined considerably since the 
mid 1970s. In fact, net industrial investment in Africa by U.K. 
companies has become relatively inconsequential, amounting to lews 
than 0.5% of total industrial FDI in 1986 compared with around 4% 
in the mid 1970s.(see table 1) This should be contrasted with 
the considerably smaller but nonetheless still very significant 
decline in the relative importance of British FDI in developing 
countries as a whole- from approximately 20% of an annual 
investment flows in the early 1970s to just over 10% in 1978. 
a whole.
The percentage of total net earnings derived from African industrial 
investments has declined somewhat less- from 4.7% in 1978 to 3.4% in 
1986- but it will undoubtedly continue to fall in the future given 
the already dramatic fall in the relative size of British net investim
in Africa. For British industrial capital as a whole, therefore. 
Africa is now of minor interest.
While investment in Africa has collapsed, British industrial FDI 
in the rest world has grown enormously, recording a nearly fourfold 
increase in annual net investment levels (in current prices) between 
1978-1986. The removal of all exchange controls in the U.K. has 
certainly been an important short term factor. However, this very 
large and rapid increase is indicative of the progressive and 
system®r-ic- exploitation of investment opportunii ies worldwide by
V«bla It Africa and total uvt*‘M * s  inicstr i al invests**-:* by 
British companies: net earnings and net investment (iC*),
1978-1936.
Net earnings Net investment
Total Africa% Total AfricaXYear Africa overseas total Africa overseas total
1978 55 1160 4,7 67 1520 4,31979 58 1466 3,9 62 1397 4,41980 91 1479 6,1 82 1427 5,71981 81 1673 4,8 68 2647 2,5
1982 91 1762 5,1 92 1579 5,8
1983 117 2145 5,4 52 2120 2,41984 116 2425 4,7 79 2100 3,2
1985 157 3060 5,0 29 2984 1,0
1986 115 3326 3,4 27 5663 0,5
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, Business Monitor 
M4 Overseas Transactions, 1970-1986.
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TNCs.(13) What is clear is that the participation of African 
economies in this process is at best marginal.
4. TOTAL INVOLVEMENTS AND SECTORAL ACTIVITY
In mid 1989 there were just 96 British registered companies out 
of a total of over twenty thousand in the U,K. with active 
investments in industrial enterprises in ESA. Between them, these 
British companies had a total of 468 investments in individual 
companies in ESA. However, as can be seen in table 2, a group of 
eleven parent companies accounted for over 50% of these 
involvements.(14) Lonrho and Unilever alone had investments in 124 
separate industrial companies in ESA, 26.4% of the total.
Although the data are not available, it seems likely that the 
degree of TNC concentration is considerably higher in Africa than in 
Asia and Latin America, and will continue to increase in the 
future as smaller. less involved British companies withdraw from 
Africa (see below).
Table 3 shows that the large majority of British companies with 
industrial involvements in ESA are truly transnational in the 
sense that they generally very large corporate entities with 
global equity interests. Over 75% and 90% of these companies had 
interests in more than five and two countries respectively.
While there is a group of 8-10 relatively very small' 
companies whose ESA operations do represent a significant proportion 
of their global turnover, capital and profit (e.g. Aberfoyle 
l'oidif:£S and African Lakes Corporation; for the remaining 
parent companies, their African operations are relatively very small
.'.--.h i®  2 ;  '»iT,y ■; ►p v c I  '  ?;.V ? 1.1. s v,>;,-
F^A,
if&.smr> t*r Wumbfe* U * ¥■* T»i V: ^ \ %
in vu l v » o e n t s  p a re n t ca«#panjifc?s inv-^i ✓ «-»***$ <*
1 38 m 8, 2
2 18 8 . 3
3 4 12 2 . 6
4 7 28 6 . 0
5 6 30 6 .4
6 3 18 3 . 8
7 4 28 6 . 0
e 5 40 8 . 5
9 1 9 1 .9
lO 3 30 6 . 4
12 2 24 5 .1
13 1 13 2 . 8
18 1 18 3 . 8
20 1 20 4 . 2
58 1 58 1 2 .3
66 1 66 14.1
Totals 96 468 1 0 0 .0
Source: Survey of British company i nvol veiaent in Engli!
speaking Africa, 1989,
Table 3: Characteristics of U.K. parent company global
operations.
Interval value Turnover(tra. ;■ Employment?’000) Capitalfim. ) No. countrief
9th decile 5939 .93 3451 46
Upper quartile 2697 45 999 30
Median 704 14 357 13
Lower quartile 196 73 5
1st decile 7 15 2
Number "92 ..72 79 36
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in global terms and their importance will probably decline still 
further as British TNCs continue to concentrate their overseas 
investments in Europe, North America and, to a lesser extent, South 
East Asia.
Given the serious problems involved in converting turnover arid 
net asset data which are expressed in local currency units into 
pounds sterling values, employment data probably provide a better 
indicator of the absolute and relative size of involvement of 
UK. parent companies in ESA industrial enterprises.
In only five of the twenty companies who completed the questionnair 
did employment in their ESA companies exceed five percent of total 
company employment worldwide. Although the data are still 
incomplete, there are now probably no more than ten British 
companies where more than twenty percent of their global 
turnover comes from their African industrial investments and 
most of these companies are actively seeking new investment 
opportunities outside of Africa.(15)
Table 4 summarises the available data on the employment size of 
individual ESA industrial enterprise with U.K. company equity 
involvements. Nearly 50% of the 56 enterprises in the sample 
have less than 200 employees which is very small in global terms.
Less than ten percent of them employ more than 1000 people.
The sectoral pattern of British industrial EDI in ESA has 
remained fundamentally unchanged during the 1980s. This is nob 
surprising given that "there has hardly been any change in the
Table 4: Number of employees in ESA industrial enterprises with British 
equity involvements. 1939.
Number
employees
Kenya Nigeria Z imbabwe Others Total
1000+ 0(0) 2( 13) 2(13) 0(0) 4(7)
500-999 3(20) 4(25) 3(19) 0(0) 10(18)
200-499 6(40) 2(13) 7(44) 2(22) 17(30)
100-199 2(13) 6(37) 1(6) 4(44) 13(23)
1-99 4(27) 2(13) 3( 19) 3(33) 12(21)
Total 15 16 16 9 56
( ) percentage values. Do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Table 5: Industrial sectoral involvements of 
in ESA, 1989 (percentages).
Britis h industrial companie
Country Cement Chemio Metal Meeh Elect Trans. Food Textiles Wood/bricks rubber goods eng in goods equip. drink clothing paper
Ghana 6.25 12.50 IS 75 18.75 0.0 0. 0 18 75 18.75 6.25Kenya 6.50 29.90 10. 40 7.30 3.90 2.60 13.0 5.20 9.10Malawi 7. 10 14.30 28.60 14. 30 0. 0 0. 0 28. CO 7. 10 0. 0
Nigeria 4. 70 25.60 10. .50 10. 50 j 0. 50 1 . 20 17.40 7.0 12.80Zambia 1.5 10 20. 10 3 40 15 10 5 7 0 1.90 22.60 9.40 0 0Zimbabwe 4.90 21.70 IP. 10 11.9 7.0 3.50 23. 10 4. 90 7. 0
All ESA 6.50 23.20 12.30 5 1.40 s 0 2.20 23.80 6.80 7.70
Note; Only ESA countries with ten or more equity ir 
separately delineated.
Food, drink also 3nt-ludes tobacco jerduc-ts.
vernents have been
structure of manufacturing industry in developing Africa since 
the early 1960s (UNECA, 1938: 95). Thus, low technology, low value 
added import substitution activities continue to predominate 
with food, drink and tobacco and chemicals and rubber 
accounting for nearly 50% of total company involvements (see 
table 5). Some ESA countries (including Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, 
Liberia and Sudan) are attempting to reduce the national market 
orientation of FDI via the creation of more "supply orientated" 
export processing zones but none have yet succeeded in attracting 
any significant investment.(16)
There has been no British investment in enterprises producing more 
sophisticated and advanced products particularly in the areas of 
electronics and information technology. While nearly 20% of 
British corporate industrial involvements in ESA are in mechanical 
and electrical engineering, with the exception of Zimbabwe, the 
capital goods sector as a whole remains seriously underdeveloped.
5. COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT
British industrial FDI in ESA is heavily concentrated in Kenya, 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe (see table 6). Between them, these three 
countries account for nearly three quarters of British 
industrial investment involvements in ESA (Zimbabwe 31.2%, Kenya 
21.4% and Nigeria 20.2%). Given the serious currency distortions 
that have prevailed in Africa during the 1980s (including the 
grossly overvalued naira in Nigeria up until 1987), the number of 
separate company investments is probably a more accurate
indicator of the extent of British company involvement in 
individual ESA couuntries than the total (pounds sterling! value
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of investments.(see table 6)
Even in the relatively l a r g e  countries of Ghana, Malawi and 
Tanzania, the number of British parent companies directly e n ga ge d  
in industrial production is very small indeed. For the remainder 
of ESA, British industrial FDI is minimal and is generally 
confined to the production of basic wage goods, most notably 
tobacco and alcohol. The Commonwealth Development Corporation 
does however play a prominent role in some of the smaller ESA 
countries, particularly Swaziland.
6. EQUITY PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL
Data on the pattern of equity participation were collected for 
over 805S of the British corporate involvements in ESA. With the 
exception of Nigeria, Malawi and Swaziland, over 75% of the 
British TNCs in the other ESA countries had majority ownership of 
the companies in which they had invested (see table 7). 
Maintaining this majority ownership position appears to be a key 
objective for British TNCs in ESA and explains why many of those 
with investments in Nigeria, where over 75% of them are minority 
shareholders, are pessimistic about their future prospects in 
this country.
It is precisely in those sectors where British involvement *n ESA 
is heavily concentrated (branded foods, beverages, tobacco, 
pharmaceuticals) where it has beer, generally observed that TNCs 
prefer wholly or majority owned subsidiary companies as the 
preferred form of invol vement (UHCTC. I M S ; .
Table As Total industrial equity i n volyaannts aid total industrial 
invcotWRits of British companies in ESft countries.
Country
Total U.K.
parent
companies
Total equity % 
involvements total
U.K. indust 
investment 
1984 <£m.>
% total
Botswana S 5 i. 1
Gambia 1 i 0,2
Ghana io 23 4.9 25 2.6Kenya 47 lOO 21.4 101 10.4Lesotho 1 1 0.2 m m
Liberia 2 2 0.4 „ . m ,
Malawi 13 18 3.8 33 3.4
Nigeria 45 95 20.2 429 44.3Sierra Leone 3 3 0.6 11 1.1
Sudan 2 2 0,4 *  „ * .
Swazi 1 and 4 9 1.9 IO 1.0
Tanzani a 7 7 1.5 .  . *  .
Uganda 7 8 1.7 •  • •  •
Zambia 27 43 10.2 59 6. 1
Zimbabwe AO 146 31.2 188 19.4
Total 5 96* 468 100.0 968 100.0
Notest • Number of individual company involvements does not add up to 96 
because SOX of the parent companies have involvements in more 
than one ESA country.
Source: See table 2 and Department of Trade and Industry, Triennial Census
of British Assets Overseas 1984.
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Table 7: Percentage size of equity involvements of British companies 
in industrial enterprises in ESA.
Percentage of equity held
Country 0-25 26-50 51-75 76-99 100 Total
Botswana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 100. 0 3
Gambia 100. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 1
Ghana 0. 0 0. 0 83.3 0. 0 17. 3 6
Kenya 6.2 18. 7 28.0 3. 1 43.8 32
Lesotho 100.0 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 1
Liberia 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 50. 0 50. 0 2
Malawi 14. 3 42.9 14. 3 0. 0 28.6 7
Nigeria 26. 7 48.9 24. 4 0. 0 0. 0 45
Sierra Leone 0. 0 0.0 0. 0 100. 0 0. 0 1
Sudan 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0.0 100. 0 1
Swaziland 57. 1 42.9 0.0 0.0 0. 0 7
Tanzania 0. 0 20.0 0. 0 20.0 60. 0 6
Uganda 0. 0 0.0 60.0 0. 0 40. 0 5
Zambia 18.2 4. 5 18.2 9. 1 50. 0 22
Zimbabwe 7.7 5.3 17.3 1.9 67.3 52
Table 8: Expatriate industrial managers and technicians employed by 
British parent companies in ESA.
Country Number ESA 
enterprises
Enterprises*? with one 
or more expatriates
% Average no. expats 
per enterprise
Kenya 6 4 66.6 2.0
Nigeria 12 9 75.0 4. 1
Z imbabwe 3 2 25. 0 0. 25
Source: Suestionnaire retu:rr«s
Time series dL vta on trie percentage of ownership of British FDI in 
ESA industrial companies are unavailable but it is unlikely that 
there have been any major changes during the 1980s. With no 
major equity indigenisation legislation irs any ESA country since 
the mid 1970s, British companies have retained overall ownership 
control wherever possible.(17)
Little is also known about the equity partners in ESA industrial 
companies that are less than 100% British owned. The limited
data from the questionnaire returns show however that the state 
is often a major shareholder in Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania 
and Zambia. Given the very difficult economic conditions that 
have prevailed in these countries during the 1980s, joint 
ownership with the state (frequently the national industrial 
development corporation) has probably been a key element of these 
companies survival strategies.
The extent to which expatriate, predominantly British (i.e “home 
country national") managers and technicians are employed by ten 
U.K. parent companies with equity involvements in 26 ESA industrial 
enterprises is summarised in table 8. Most British industrial 
investments in ESA service small, tariff protected national markets 
and are not therefore constituent parts of globally integrated 
production systems (as has been the case in the automobile and 
electronics industries). This obviates the need for tight, 
centralised control of production activities by subsidiaries in ESA. 
The employment of expatriates is not therefore based on the need 
to maintain control per se but rather on the assessment of the 
British parent company concerning the availability of high quality
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national managers in the necessary areas of specialisation. The 
questionnaire returns indicate that at least one expatriate 
manager is normally employed by majority owned British companies 
in Nigeria (with as many as 10-15 in large subsidiaries), but in 
Zimbabwe, with its still relatively largely number of experienced 
European managers, this is the exception rather than the rule. 
Subsidiaries in Kenya occupy an intermediate position. It 
would appear therefore that the expatriate employment policies 
of British TNCs have changed very little during the 1980s 
(see Abdin et. al. , 1982).
7. PROFITABILTY, NET INVESTMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT
The profitability of British industrial FDI has fallen to 
very low levels for many parent companies and their 
shareholders during the 1980s and, as a result a significant 
proportion of these companies have disposed of their African 
investments.
Table 9 compares the rates of return measured in local currency 
units of 32 British subsidiaries in ESA with those obtained 
globally by their 19 parent companies in 1988. While half of 
these subsidiaries had RORs higher or roughly the same as their 
parent companies, for most of the remainder their RORs were some 
ten percentage points lower The really critical issue however 
has been Uie chronic and persistent shortage of foreign exchange 
in ESA during the 1980s which has meant that, because subsidiaries 
have usually been unabic to remit'most of their profits u they 
have keen subject to long delays), the effective RCRs in sterling
18
Table 9i 1988 rates of return* on capital employed by a sample
of British TNCs in English speaking Africa.
Parent sector Global Kenya Nigeria Zimbabwe 1
Food & tobacco 
1. 10.2 19.5 22.7 25.0
2. 24.2 7.4 4.B
3. 18.2 -10.0
Textiles
4. 21.5 19.8
5. 11.9 11.0
Chemicals !< 
pharmaceuticals
6. 21.2 9.4 8.8 13.7
7. 18.9 19.6 -10.0
8. 19.6 9.4
9. 15.4 14.5(2
Construction
materials
10. 23.2 (4.0) (2.4) (2.2)
11. 5.1 16.5
12. 11.3 -11.9 22.0
Paper tc 
printing
13. 25.9 0.3
14. 31.8 5.4
Metal goods 
15. 20.1 17.9
16. 23.0 21.2 26.0 16.6
17. 14.2 28.2
Electrical
goods
18. 24.9 18.8
19. 17.1 11.7
26.9
25.0
Notasi
The rate of return" (local post-tax profits/capital employed).lOO 
Source! As table 2.
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terms to parent companies have been considerably less than the
often quite respectable local currency RORs. Thus, in Nigeria
profit remittances have been minimal for most of the 1980s while
in Zimbabwe most' remittances were reduced from 50% to 25% of post 
tax profits in early 1987. The end result has been that the
rate of return from British industrial FDI in ESA has typically
been two-three times less than in Europe and North America and
considerably lower than from similar types of investments in
developing countries in other regions of the world.
Analysis of the annual overseas transactions and triennial assets 
census data published by the Department of Trade and Industry 
reveals that, in aggregate terms, the rates of return on African 
industrial FDI between 1978 and 1984 were not markedly different 
from the RORs for all British industrial FDI and, at least up until 
the mid 1980s, showed no major decline (see table 10). However, 
with the growing inability of African companies to remit profits 
attributable to British shareholders during the 1980s, effective 
RORs have plummetted. In addition, it is interesting to note that 
the RORs on non-industrial FD! in Africa were nearly double those 
from industrial FDI between 1978-1984. If this differential 
persists, one would expect that British FDI in Africa will become 
increasingly concentrated in non-industrial activities in 
particular, agriculture, eneigy, distribution and financial 
services.
The decline in the profitability of v'riti%h indue*.rial FDI in ESA 
has led in <j-’i to a significant drop it, net investment levels 
noth in terra* .a ion tc to n->o *
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■: ngs
Rates of return on British industrial and non-industrial investments•siOie 1
in Africa and the world, 1978 - 1984
- Net. e;trnings (£m) Capital employed (£m) Rate of return (%)
Africa Africa Af rica Africa Africa
Indus trial Non-industr .al Global Industrial Non-industrial Global Industrial Non-industrial Global
j
, 1 7 (ji '?• 5 129 2346 463 863 19108 11,8 14,9 12,3
1 *>Vi ij 3 ’' 185 3546 836 1076 28545 9,7 17,2 12,4
1 1 6  
i
302 7725 968 1 369 7571 5 12,0 22,1 9,8
Soutce: see tables 1 and 3
(see table 1). Our data show that virtually no major
investments in new companies in ESA have been made by British
companies during the 1980s. Furthermore, whereas the ratio of net 
earnings to net investment had been approximately 1:1 in the
early 1980s, it had increased to 4:1 by 1986. In other words,
most British TNCs in ESA have been sitting on their existing
investments trying to earn whatever returns they can from them.
The widespread undercapitalisation of foreign subsidiaries in ESA
is an important consequence of this.
The questionnaire returns indicate that the availability of foreign 
exchange to purchase inputs and remit profits has been 
the most critical factor in undermining the profitability of 
British industrial FDI in ESA.(18) Nearly 75% of respondents 
ranked foreign exchange availability as the most serious 
constraint facing their companies in ESA. Other commonly cited 
constraints are repeated currency depreciations, price controls, 
government bureaucracy and corruption, minority ownership and 
generally depressed economic conditions.
Interestingly, not one parent company mentioned the need for more 
attractive investment incentives (such as tax holidays) in order 
to encourage FDI in the future. This is despite the fact that most 
ESA governments have already or are in the process of revising 
and/or introducing new foreign investment codes. It would seem 
that most British companies remain deeply sceptical about the 
significance of these new codes.(19) As research has shown
elsewhere, the most critical, factors influencing FDT flows are 
the general economic and political stability of a country
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coupled with fundamental market and cost considerations.
(see Guisinger, 1986)
The World Bank-IMF supported structural adjustment programmes 
that have now been adopted by most ESA governments are unlikely
to improve the profitability of British FI)I in the immediate
future and may well in fact lead to further declines in RORs,
Market liberalisation allows companies readier access to foreign
exchange thereby easing input, and profit remittance problems but
structural adjustment has resulted in massive currency
devaluations which have slashed the sterling values of profit
remittances and the value of foreign investments themselves.
For example, the introduction of the second foreign exchange
market in Nigeria in 1986 reduced within the space of a few
months the foreign exchange value of company remittances to
between one-third and one-quarter of their previous levels.
Even more serious is the prospect of major reductions in import
tariffs and other quantitative import restrictions that threaten
the viability of key industries in ESA.
For many British TNCs in Africa, structural adjustment has 
probably come too late. Some are so "Africa weary" (20' that they 
want to disengage completely or focus their overseas investment 
efforts elsewhere.(21l One of the most revealing findings of the 
research is that nearly one third of the British companies who h 
industrial FD> involvements in ESA in the late 1 :)?0s had already . 
disposed of these investments by mid 1989.(22) As car, be seen 
in table .11 this process of b ioengagement has ’■ok,-r; place r ight
across iitlA. (281 However- hy far ’.he largost number uf companies
Table 11. British TNC withdrawal *rcw» industrial equity Englisti speaking A-frica, 1979—1989.
i:>vcsS. vemerrts
U.K. parent Total Total Withdrawn
Country withdrawn remaining 1979-99 X
Batswana 0 s 5 0,0
Gambia o 1 1 0,0
Ghana 5 10 15 33,3
Kenya lO Cl) 47 57 21,3
Lesotho 0 1 1 0,0
Liberia 2 2 4 50,0
Malawi 7 13 20 35,0
Nigeria 23(2) 45 6S Oo , 8
Sierra Leone 2 3 5 0,0
Sudan 1 2 3 33,3
Swazi 1 and 1 4 5 20,0
Tanzani a 8 7 15 53,3
Uganda 7 7 14 50,0
Zambi a 17 27 44 38,6
Zimbabwe 37(2) 60 97 38,1
All ESA 43(5) 96 139 30,9
Notes: Figures in parentheses are number of TNCs who were in the process 
withdrawing during 1989.
Source: See table 2.
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have withdrawn from Zimbabwe (37) , Nigeria (23) and Zambia (17). 
Zimbabwe was in the grip of "disinvestment fever" in 1987-88 with 
leading British companies selling out to local companies and, in 
a few cases, to local management (see EIU, 1.987) (24).
There does not appear to be any particular pattern to these 
disengagements with regard to specific industrial activities. 
Approximately half have been in the consumer goods sector with 
the remainder split equally between intermediate arid capital 
goods. Only one company withdrew involuntarily when its 
subsidiary in Zimababwe was nationalised soon after Independence 
in 1980.
For the majority of British TNCs with limited involvements in 
ESA, disengaging is a relatively straightforward process. Some, 
in fact, have already written off their African investments and, 
as the recent experience in Zimbabwe has shown, an increasing 
number are prepared to accept very large discounts on their current 
market values in return for being able to remit the proceeds of 
disinvestments to their British shareholders.(25)
For a smaller group of companies with larger investments 
disengagement is not so simple. Many of these companies would 
withdraw if they could obtain what they consider to be realistic 
prices for their assets. For the two TNC industrial giants, 
Lonrhc and Onilever, comprehensive disengagement is not a viable 
alternative.(26) If anything, their leading positions in the 
indus.”.'- r’ai .sectors of many ESA countries may increase in the future 
as a rei, . ; r. of the continued withdrawal of more British and other TNCs,
some of which they may even decide to acquire at bargain 
prices.<275
There are other important consequences of corporate disengagement 
that will require further, more detailed research at the country 
level. According to dependency theory (at least its cruder 
versions), the withdrawal of foreign capital and TNCs in 
particular from developing countries is an essential precondition 
for any viable national industrial development strategy and is 
therefore to be welcomed.(28) Certainly, where a relatively 
strong national industrial capitalist class already exists, 
as in Zimbabwe, then the withdrawal of some foreign capital 
could help to strenghten this class and thus ultimately provide 
the basis for a dynamic, autocentric industrial development 
process. However, where such a class is still very weak, as is 
the case in most of ESA, it is not clear precisely what the 
consequences of varying degrees of TNC withdrawal and/or 
disinterest are likely to be.
In the past, the state would have probably taken a leading role but 
given the wave of liberalisation coupled with privatisation that 
is sweeping across Africa, this does not seem very likely. With the 
increasingly attractive investment incentives being offered to 
foreign investors, Asian and Middle Eastern (mainly Lebanese) 
businessmen who have traditionally played key roles in the 
industrial and commercial sectors of East and West ESA may avail 
themselves of these new opportunities.(29) Increasingly powerful 
Third World TNCs may also be more prepared than their counterparts 
from the industrial countries to invest in Africa.
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A third possible consequence is that nobody will step in to take 
the place of departing TNCs with resulting losses in 
national industrial capacities. With easy access to 
increasingly unprotected domestic markets, it is conceivable that 
many British and other TMCs could dispense altogether with 
industrial production in Africa and rely instead on the assured 
foreign exchange returns from direct trade with these countries. 
In other words, a certain amount of deindustrialisation 
associated with a return to colonial type mercantilism is a 
distinct possibility in the future.
Finally, there may be a greater preparedness by British TMCs to 
rely more on non equity involvements in Africa, in particular 
licence and management agreements as long as payments are made 
mainly in advance in foreign exchange. Such externalised forms 
of involvement have become increasingly popular among TNCs 
throughout the world since the mid 1970s (see UNCTC, 1987).
The exact extent, of industrial licence agreements in ESA is not 
known. Among the twenty British companies who completed the 
questionnaire, licence agreements are rare but this is to bo 
expected in overseas companies where the TOC parents have 
majority ownership. In general. however. licencing can be 
an attractive option where markets are very small and are of 
peripheral interest to a TNC'« current market thrusts. 
However before agreeing t-r, a i i < ending ogrraement., the 
ms.-ia-a:.-. • .-;t of the parent ospav must be satisfied vito the
g e n e r a l  t  ..ii ; * i , unci •:c w n i  1 . ’ ll. fa>“ ,• :Ol
more important still, be able to identify local companies or 
entrepreneurs capable of fulfilling the often stringent 
requirements of the licence. Again, with the exception of 
Zimbabwe, no ESA country is at present in a strong position 
to meet these requirements for many types of more sophisticated 
industrial activity.
8.CONCLUSION
Three main conclusions emerge from this study. First, the 
involvement of British TNCs in the industrial sectors of ESA 
countries is, in global terms, relatively inconsequential. 
While it is certainly the case that, these TNCs still play highly 
significant roles in what are small industrial sectors, it cannot 
be meaningfully argued that these involvements are anything more 
than of marginal significance for British industrial capital as a 
whole.
The demise of British industrial FDI in Africa can be mainly 
attributed to the prolonged and profound economic crisis that 
has afflicted the African continent as a whole during the last 
decade. With falling real national outputs in many countries, 
saturated domestic markets, minimal manufacturing exports 
and generally hostile investment climates, there has been little 
incentive for either existing or r:ew TNCs to invest.
Second, the study reveals that rather than increasing their 
"penetration" of African economies, there has occurred, among 
British industrial TNCs at least, a sizeable and possibly
irreversible process of disengagement during the 1980s. Whether
this process will continue in the future will depend on a number
of factors. In the words of the Chairman of a leading TNC, "we
still have a question mark on Africa. "(30) Most ESA 
governments are actively seeking to attract foreign investment but
it. seems that special incentives will in themselves have little
impact in attracting large numbers of TNCs.(31) Most of these
economies are too small to be of any real interest, especially to
TNCs that up until now have had no involvement in the continent.
Ultimately, most industrial FDI in ESA in the future will depend 
on the response of existing TNCs to growth in local markets for 
their products. For nearly all the ESA countries, their overall 
economic growth will continue to be based heavily on agricultural 
and mineral exports, the longer term prospects for which remain poor. 
If in fact the considerably higher rates of return on non 
industrial invesments continue, it is possible that the bulk of 
new F'DI will be attracted into these sectors, in particular where 
production is heavily orientated towards expert, markets.
Thirdly, many of the policies and actions of ESA government:, 
during the 1980s have directly undermined the viability of a 
•significant proportion of British TMC investment in industrial 
enterprise. argue, therefore, that the state in Africa simply
serves the interests of foreign capital is not only
oruceiy inatrumenfcaiist in conception but is not borne out by. 
much eg the enpi i-in-il evidence. The same is also true 
of the cH&godi y o cl.i :.t',. ,:ai ati.cm hip> oe> ween the World Bank 
and trie IMF on the one band ia . i Teds I> .,r- , o-a on hne other.
Certainly, the impact to date of structural adjustment programmes 
on industrial TNCs has not been generally favourable, and with 
major reductions in the levels of import protection in prospect in 
many countries, it is quite likely that the situation for these 
industrial TNCs could worsen in the future.
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I The *tlC bibliography fcr the period 1083-193? produced bv the 
New Vcrk based tinited Nations C-si.tre on Transnational Corporation 
has on.y 38 separ.-xte publications specifically on TNCs in su 
Saharan Africa out >f a total of 2585.(rs«e UNCTC,1986) Systematic 
searches of the relevant computerised bibliographical databases 
found less than thirty relevant publications. As part of the 
background research for this study, only 75 books and articles 
published during the 1980s were found. This excludes, however, 
official publications and articles in the business literature.
2. The bibliography compiled by Hilbert and Oehlmann for the 
period up until 1980 contains over 500 publications specifically 
concerned with FDI and TNCs in African countries and the 
continent as a whole.
3. British FDI in South Africa has not been included as part of 
this study. Cameroon, although partly english speaking, is 
mainly francophone in character as are the island states
of Seychelles and Mauritius.
4. The ESA percentage for value added in industrial production 
is derived from statistics published by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (see UNECA, 1987). The population 
figure comes from World Bank data.(see World Bank, 1989). British 
industrial FDI comprised between 35-45% of total British FDI in 
Africa between 1978-1986.(see DTI, Census of British Assets 
Overseas).
5. Precise country level data on the composition of FDI by 
country of origin are not available. These estimates have been
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obtained from various sources including Widstrand (1975),
Cable and Persaud (1987), Clarke (1980), Stoneman (1979;. an,-i 
Berm el1 (1984). Up to date, accurate data on French and (Jniterd 
States industrial FDI is unequally unavailable.
6. The two main British company directories are Dunn and
Bradsheet's Who Owns Whom and Pergamrnon’s Financial Data Services 
on-line data system. Both are up dated annually.. The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa produced a partial listing 
of TNCs in African countries during the early 1980s (see UNECA, 
1983). Clarke’s 1980 study of foreign investment in Zimbabwe 
is particularly thorough. In addition, the company reports 
of all British manufacturing companies listed in The Times
1000 Leading Companies in Britain, 1987/88 were examined for 
possible equity involvements in ESA.
7. Industrial enterprises covered by the survey include all 
manufacturing activities listed in sections 2-4 of the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC).
8. There are no more than five of these companies, the
most important being British Leyland which, since 1987 has been 
owned by the Dutch commercial vehicle manufacturer, DAF.
9. For example, Bennell found that over 40% of all industrial FDI 
in Ghana during the raid 1970s was owned by individual entrepreneurs 
(see Bennell, 1984).
10. The names of some "British connected" companies in Kenya, 
Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe were obtained from 
cither the British commercial attaches based in these countries 
or the Department of Trade and Industry in London.
32
11. Ds>*»pit« repeated assurances that all information would be
treated in the strictest confidence, most company chief 
executives were either not prepared to divulge information about
their African subsidiaries or other investments or said that
pressure of work prevented them or their colleagues from
completing the simple two page questionnaire.
12. The DTI’s annual publication Overseas Transactions contains 
net investment and net earnings data for British FDI by main 
economic sector and country. The triennial Census of British 
Assets Overseas gives the book values of British FDI, again 
disaggregated by sector and country. Unfortunately, the raw 
census data for 1987, the most recent census year, have still not 
been fully processed by the DTI.
13. To some extent, this growing internationalisation of 
investment is iimced witn m e  estaoiisnment or integrated 
production systems by TNCs throughout the world, as exemplified 
by the automobile and electronics industries. However, TNC 
investment in these truly transnational production systems probably 
accounts for only a relatively small proportion of total investments 
by TNCs outside of their home countries.
14. These companies are Aberfoyle Holdings, BAT, BTR, the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation, GEC, Grand Metropolitan, 
Lonrho, Paterson Zochonis, Tate & Lyle/Booker Tate, T & N, 
and Unilever.
15. This is evident from statements in their company reports and 
from correspondence in connection with the survey.
18. For a discussion of the record of EPZs in developing 
countries including those in Africa, see Kreye et. al., 1987.
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17. Major equity indigenisation legislation was introduced in 
Ghana and Nigeria in the early-mid 1970s. This restricted the 
equity participation of most industrial TNCs to either 6035 or 
40% of total equity. The Zimbabwe government has recently 
stipulated that foreign companies whose shares are not publically 
quoted overseas must reduce their shareholdings in Zimbabwean public 
companies to 5%.
18. It does not seem conceivable that these low levels of
profitability could be the result of a deliberate strategy of 
transfer pricing and, in particular, the overinvoicing of 
imports. No detailed studies of transfer pricing in ESA have 
ever been published but the scope for transfer pricing for 
companies engaged in relatively simple import substitution 
industrial activities using widely traded inputs is probably 
quite limited where general superintendence of imports is
relatively well organised.
19. The comment of the international director of a large British
TNC in response to a question about the new Investment Code in 
Zimbabwe is symptomatic of this scepticism: It is just a short
term gimmick... (President) Mugabe is a committed Marxist 
who remains fundamentally opposed to foreign capital."
20. Telephone discussion with official at the Department of Trade 
and Industry 26/6/89. Apparently the expression "Africa 
weary" is commonly used by company representatives on the 
DTI's Trade Advisory Committee on Africa.
21. The following statement by r:. - managing director of a 
British company with a relatively small investment in an ESA
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country 5s typical of this weariness: " We are almost certainly
in the process of selling our shares in .........  We seem to
get no support, from the Government or from our partners, so quite 
frankly we really are not interested any longer.... We have got 
to concentrate our efforts in Europe where there is less 
bureaucracy and one can get things done in a much faster time.
22. The membership of the West Africa Committee which represents 
the interests of foreign companies in the region fell by a
half from around 320 to 160 between 1986 and 1989. ( Interview with 
the Adviser of WAC, 8/6/89).
23. A few British disengagements have simply been the result of 
takeovers of fJ.K. parent companies by foreign companies who 
have subsequently retained their industrial investments in ESA. 
However, most disengagements have involved the active 
relinquishment of African industrial investments.
24. Two recent studies of the ownership structure of the 
industrial sector in Zimbabwe estimate that the proportions of 
total industrial capital controlled by foreign companies (defined
owning more than 50% ot total equity) were only ?.5% and 33% 
during 1888-1969 (see Humphrey, 1989 and Maya 
'I'ongoona, 5989). The latter estimate excludes the metals 
sector which is known to have a high level of local ownership,
Benr.eJ 1 found that less than half of the 430 industHal etre-erpI'isea
ettij--■ ■ .' more trsan 30 employees in Oko.na 
fne.yor it.\' ownership. i 19 vutev '  -i ihher  f-ti-
c ' l .u h r ;  s r ,e r e a d i l y  iv t . -d ih ie  foot s im i la r ,  r e l a t i v e l y  Sow 
" s v f f o r e i g n  owners-nip by th e  end n1 * he Ik 1) vs would not be 
s u r f  ; s s ' ' t <
1 9 7 ?  h - v i torei&n
V
25. The discounting of most investments was around 70% in 
Zimbabwe during 1988.
26. Nevertheless, the share of Lonrho’s turnover attributable to 
Africa (including South Africa) still fell from 34% in 1978 to 
17% in 1988. ( see Lonrho Annual Reports 1.978 and 1988).
27. This is already happening to a limited extent. For example, 
British Leyland sold its Rover subsidiary in Zanbia to Lonrho in 
1987.
28. In the African context, Samir Amin has been the most well 
known exponent of this view (see Amin, 1974).
29. At present, however, this seems limited to resource based 
activities in West Africa (in particular, the timber industry 
in Ghana), which may to lead to increased tensions between 
indigenous and foreign industrial capital.
30. John Elliott, Chairman, Elders Corporation in a speech to the 
1988 Annual Congress of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 
(see CZI, 1988).
31. Nonetheless, the increasing competition between African 
governments to attract FDI will probably considerably weaken 
their bargaining positions with TNCs and other foreign investors.
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